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Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine:
A Thing Done by Halves?
Gennadiy Druzenko ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
About two years have passed since the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) decided Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v.
Ukraine,1 a case in which the Court held that Ukraine violated 2
Article 9 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.3 At first glance, this case belongs to the line
of ECtHR’s case law which includes cases such as: Metropolitan
Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, 4 Moscow Branch of the

∗ LLB (International Science and Technology University, Kyiv, Ukraine), LLM (Kyiv
National Taras Shevchenko University, Ukraine), LLM in European Law (University of
Aberdeen, Scotland, UK). An earlier edition of this paper was delivered to the Noodt
Consultation on the Strasbourg Conference Project, Geneva, Switzerland, June 22, 2008.
1. Application no. 77703/01 (2007), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/
(follow “Case-Law” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search application
number “77703/01”).
2. It was the second case Ukraine lost in the European Court of Human Rights under
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The first case was Poltoratskiy v.
Ukraine, 39 Eur. Ct. H.R. 43 (2004).
3. Article 9 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms guarantees the freedom of religion and provides that:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in
worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 9, Sept.
1953, CETS 5, available at http://conventions.coe.int/ (follow “Treaties” hyperlink; follow
“Complete list” hyperlink; follow “Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms” hyperlink). Today, forty-seven European countries including Russia,
Turkey, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, but excluding Belarus, are signatories of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, also known as
European Convention on Human Rights.
4. 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 13 (2002).
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Salvation Army v. Russia,5 and Church of Scientology Moscow v.
Russia.6 In all these cases, typical of former Soviet Republics, the
state refused to register the “wrong” (from its point of view)
religious organization and, thus, prevented the religious organization
from obtaining status as a legal entity.
However, Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine also belongs
to another line of case law that started with Serif v. Greece, 7 and
continued in Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria8 and partly in
Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova. 9 All cases
of this type deal with divided religious communities in circumstances
where the state attempts to determine which part of the divided
community is the proper assignee of the undivided predecessor. The
peculiarity of this line of cases is that, in making this determination,
the state does not examine or judge religious doctrine and does not
doubt the religious doctrine’s legitimacy. Instead, the state tries to
prevent the religious community from dividing, thereby forcing
separated groups to reunite—or at least to identify the proper legal
successor of the formerly undivided organization.
In addition to these shared characteristics, Svato-Mykhaylivska
Parafiya has its own unique features. Below I argue that even
though this case undoubtedly dealt with freedom of religion, it was
essentially a corporate and property dispute. To substantiate this
view, I start with a brief explanation of the historical and factual
background against which events described in the judgment
happened, mentioning in passing some factual lapses by the Court. I
then briefly outline Ukrainian legislation in the field of religious
freedom to demonstrate the general correctness of the Court’s
critique of this legislation. Next, I critique the Court’s abstention
from considering the argument between rival groups of believers as a
property and corporate dispute. Finally, I present the domestic
reaction to the ECtHR’s judgment.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX
CHURCH
From its foundation in the tenth to the end of the twelfth
century, and from the midst of the fifteenth to the end of the
seventeenth century, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was
independent from the Russian, or more precisely, the Moscow
Church10 and was a Metropolis (Archdiocese) of the Ecumenical
Patriarchate of Constantinople. As Ukrainian territories gradually
joined the Moscow Kingdom in the second part of the seventeenth
century, however, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople was
forced to abdicate jurisdiction over the Kyiv Metropolis to his
Moscow counterpart. In the early twentieth century, during the
short time of Ukrainian independence, the Ukrainian self-governing
(so-called Autocephalous) Orthodox Church was established. The
Ukrainian Orthodox Church was later annihilated by Soviet power in
the 1930s, revived during German occupation in the 1940s, and
officially revived again in 1989 on the eve of the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Thus, in the early 1990s there were two Orthodox
Churches in Ukraine: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow
Patriarchate (UOC MP) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous
Orthodox Church (UAOC). In March of 1992, the leader of the
UOC MP, Metropolitan Filaret, was forced by the Archbishop
Council of the Moscow Patriarchate to retire from his position. He
refused, however, to resign himself to the Council decision and took
part of the UOC MP and united with part of the UAOC to establish
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC KP).
It should thus be born in mind that the Svato-Mykhaylivska
Parish, established in 1989, began when great changes in the
structure of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine were taking place.
Thousands of orthodox parishes unexpectedly faced the dilemma of
choosing which Church to affiliate with when their religious leaders,
who had just publicly mauled each other, suddenly amalgamated
into new churches. The critical lack of temples surviving after the
Soviet fight against religion, in conjunction with the jump in the
10. From establishment of the ancient state of Kyivan Rus in the tenth century (and
even earlier) to the middle of the seventeenth century, “Rus” and its derivatives were
associated with the territory of modern Ukraine, or at least parts of Ukraine, and only in the
second half of the seventeenth century was this name, together with Ukrainian lands, gradually
appropriated by the Moscow Kingdom. Such transition of the Moscow Kingdom into the
Russian Empire was completed by Peter the Great’s reforms at the beginning of the 1700s.
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number of religious organizations, led to intense competition for the
churches, particularly between orthodox communities of different
jurisdictions. Sometimes such rivalries ran to extremes and escalated
into violence. Under these circumstances, the decision of the SvatoMykhaylivska Parish, approved by the Parishioners’ Assembly in
1992, to act under the religious guidance of the Archbishop of the
Finnish Orthodox Church in canonical issues, 11 does not seem as
peculiar as it may at first glance.
A. The Government’s Role in the Church Conflict
In contrast to the UAOC, which was restored in 1989 on the
initiative of some believers and clergymen in spite of the authorities’
resistance, the UOC KP was established after consultation with and
approval from the first Ukrainian President. Thus, while the
Ukrainian government clearly supported one Orthodox Church,
namely the UOC KP, this came at the cost of the two other
orthodox churches, the UAOC and the UOC MP. However, the
position of the local authorities and believers differed from region to
region and thus weakened the effectiveness of the central
government attempts “to build [a] unified independent Ukrainian
Orthodox Church as a spiritual foundation of the independent
Ukrainian State.”12
After the Presidential election and change of the Ukrainian Head
of State in 1994, the inclinations of the regime shifted completely to
support the UOC MP. Since then, the UOC MP has been in good
order with the new Kuchma administration. Thus, it is no wonder
that in the course of the conflict within the Svato-Mykhaylivska
Parish between supporters of different orthodox denominations
(which happened during the second and more authoritarian term of
Kuchma’s presidency), all government agencies, including lawenforcement, tax authorities, and the Ukrainian courts, only
supported adherents of the Moscow Patriarchate. In a conversation
with a high-ranking official of the State Committee of the Religious
Affairs, I was told that it was the standpoint of the Presidential

11. Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, § 12, application no. 77703/01 (2007),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (follow “Case-Law” hyperlink; then follow
“HUDOC” hyperlink; then search application number “77703/01”).
12. This phrase is often ascribed to the first Ukrainian President Mr. Leonid Kravchuk,
and it indeed conveys the very essence of his ideology of the state-church relations.
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Administration,13 and perhaps of President Kuchma personally, that
all property of the Svato-Mykhaylivska Parish should belong to the
community that left under the jurisdiction of the Moscow
Patriarchate.
III. SVATO-MYKHAYLIVSKA PARAFIYA V. UKRAINE
Having outlined the historical background on which the SvatoMykhaylivska Parish’s conflict occurred, I proceed to the subject
matter of the case. At the time of the division, the SvatoMykhaylivska Parish had existed about 10 years. The Parish was
established in 1989 and was granted legal entity status on
February 8, 1993.14 By the end of the 1990s, the Parish had
launched construction of its impressive temple complex in Kyiv,
Ukraine’s capital. In addition, when the division between
parishioners occurred, the Parish had already erected and owned
several chapels and other ancillary buildings.
In March of 1990, when the Parish’s first charter was approved
by the religious association (then a group of believers with legal
status similar to an ordinary partnership), and registered by the
competent authority,15 the governing bodies of the Parish were the
Parishioners’ Assembly, the Parishioners’ Council, and the
Supervisory Board. Mr. Makarchikov was the chairman of the
Parishioners’ Council. Later, the Parish changed its legal status and
charter, but up to the end of 1999, the framework of the Parish’s

13. Unlike in the United States, the Ukraine Presidential administration does not mean
government (which is formed by the Parliament and headed by the Prime-minister), but rather
the Presidential administration helps a Head of State to perform his duties. However, during
Kuchma’s tenure, particularly in his second term, his Presidential Administration played the
role of éminence grise in Ukrainian politics and was often more powerful than the Cabinet of
Ministers.
14. The judgment implies that the Parish obtained legal entity status only in February of
1993, Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya, § 14, however, there are reasons to believe that it could
have happened earlier. Paragraph four of the Resolution of the Ukrainian Parliament “On
Procedure for Entering into Force of the Act of Ukraine On the Freedom of Conscience and
Religious Organizations” of April 23, 1991, provided that religious organizations that had
been registered (naturally without legal entity status) before the Act entered into force had
until January 1, 1992, to submit their charters to registering authorities. There are no
explanations in the text of the judgment why the Parish delayed its transformation into a legal
entity until the beginning of 1993 while it was already possible in 1991. See Svato-Mykhaylivska
Parafiya, § 14.
15. At that time, the registering authority was the Religious Affairs Council at the
Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.
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governmental structure and the leadership of Mr. Makarchikov in the
Parishioners’ Council remained immutable.
The Parish’s charter, which was registered by the competent
authority on February 8, 1993, and had been in force until the end
of 1999, states:
2.1. The highest governing body of the Parish is the Parishioners’
Assembly, which is eligible in presence of not less than 2/3 of
members of the Parishioners’ Assembly. Resolutions of the
Parishioners’ Assembly shall be adopted by a simple majority.
....
2.5. All official Parish documents shall be signed by the prior and
the chair of the Parishioners’ Council; banking and other financial
documents shall be signed by the chair of the Parishioners’ Council
and the treasurer.
....
2.12. The Parishioners’ Assembly shall accept new members from
clergymen and laymen at their request, provided they are at least 18
years of age, attend religious services and confession, follow the
canonical guidance of the prior and have not been
excommunicated by the church or are being judged by the
religious court.
....
6.1. Decisions as to changes and amendments to the statute shall
be proposed by the Parishioners’ Council and adopted by the
Parishioners’ Assembly.16

From 1994 onward, the ecclesiastic authorities of the UOC MP
pushed the Parish to amend its original charter in order to bring it in
line with the model parish charter of the UOC MP. However, the
Parish refused to do so on several different occasions. In the last
quarter of 1999, tension between the Parish’s management and the
UOC MP ecclesiastical authorities escalated. The UOC MP accused
the Parish’s leaders of bad management of the economic activities of
the Parish, although the legal basis for such an intervention by the
ecclesiastical authorities in the Parish business was unclear. At the
same time, some of the Parish’s laymen accused Mr. Makarchikov

16.
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and two clergymen of misusing funds that were raised for the
construction of the church.
In short, the situation in the fourth quarter of 1999 became
tense and contentious. On December 24, 1999, at a meeting
attended by 21 of 27 members, the Parishioners’ Assembly resolved
to change the Parish’s affiliation and canonical guidance from the
Moscow Patriarchate to the Kyiv Patriarchate. The leader of the Kyiv
Patriarchate, Patriarch Filaret, accepted the decision of the Parish
and admitted it as a religious community acting under his
jurisdiction. Some days later, authorized representatives of the Parish
submitted to the Kyiv City State Administration all documents
necessary to register the amendments to the Parish’s charter aimed at
legalizing the religious community’s denominational shift. All these
events occurred during several days at the end of 1999.
On January 1, 2000, adherents of the Moscow Patriarchate (who
were the Parish’s members as well as outsiders) gained control over
all the Parish’s premises. The next day, more than 300 believers
(whose membership in or relationship with the Parish was at least
questionable) held a meeting and discharged Mr. Makarchikov,
elected new governing bodies for the religious community, and
adopted a new charter in complete conformity with the model parish
charter of the UOC MP. The fact that no one from the original
Parish’s Assembly took part in the meeting was merely ignored.
Thereafter, the original Parish’s Assembly and Parish’s Council,
led by Mr. Makarchilov and backed by Patriarch Filaret, filed a
number of complaints and claims before Ukrainian authorities,
particularly law enforcement bodies such as the police and the
prosecutor’s office, with requests to defend their property rights.
Unfortunately,
the
reaction
of
law-enforcement
was
counterproductive. For instance, the chief of the district police
department threatened to initiate a criminal investigation against Mr.
Makarchikov if he continued to confront the supporters of the
Moscow Patriarchate. The sister of Mr. Makarchilov even requested
political asylum in Norway on the grounds of alleged persecution in
Ukraine linked to her participation in the Parish controversy and
blood ties with her brother.
Despite the intervention by several members of the Ukrainian
Parliament into the case, the active protest of Patriarch Filaret against
the “seizure of the church” by the Moscow Patriarchate, and despite
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the case’s publicity,17 the Kyiv City State Administration on
January 21, 2000, refused to register the amendments approved by
the original Parish’s Assembly on December 24, 1999. Thereafter,
the believers that backed Mr. Makarchikov filed the case before the
Kyiv City Court complaining that the Kyiv City State
Administration’s refusal to register the Parish charter’s amendments
of December 24, 1999, was unlawful. On April 21, 2000, the Kyiv
City Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims (reasons for this decision
will be scrutinized later). The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme
Court of Ukraine, which upheld the Kyiv Court’s finding. Having
then exhausted all domestic remedies, the original Parish Assembly
decided in its meeting on October 6, 2000, to file the case before
the ECtHR in Strasbourg.18
In Strasbourg, fortune smiled upon the believers led by Mr.
Makarchikov. At the outset, the ECtHR rejected the Ukrainian
government’s objections concerning admissibility of the
application, 19 and then the Court found that the Ukrainian
Government did interfere with the freedom of religion rights of Mr.
Makarchikov’s religious association.20 Thereafter, the Strasbourg
Court held that even though such interference was prescribed by
law, 21 such interference did not pursue a legitimate end and was not
necessary in a democratic society; therefore it was unjustified. 22
While the Court concluded that the refusal to register amendments
to the Parish’s charter approved by the original Parish’s Assembly
constituted a violation of Article 9 of the Convention on Human
Rights, it decided that the applicant’s complaint that Ukraine had
violated its property rights protected under Article 1 of Protocol 1 to
the Convention was premature.23 Apart from these substantive

17. See, e.g., Yuriv Doroshenko, Na maydani kolo tserkvi vzhe nikhto nikudi ne yde
[Nobody go anywhere at the square near the Church], UKRAYINA MOLODA [THE YOUTH OF
UKRAINE], Jan. 22, 2000.
18. Because of the limited scope of this paper, I deliberately omit details of other
litigation launched by Mr. Makarchikov together with his fellow believers against SvyatoMykhaylivska Parish (Moscow Patriarchate) for the return of their personal property. I also
omit any further details of persecutions that original members of the Parish’s Assembly suffered
from Ukrainian authorities since those were not the subject matter of the ECtHR proceeding.
19. Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, § 12.
20. Id. § 123.
21. Id. § 129.
22. Id. § 152.
23. Id. § 107.
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holdings, the ECtHR in dicta evaluated the Ukrainian legislation
concerning religious freedom.24
IV. THE ECTHR’S JUDGMENT IN LIGHT OF UKRAINIAN
LEGISLATION
The last mentioned fact leads us to further analysis of the
judgment in light of and in comparison with the domestic law, of
which the core piece is the Act of Ukraine On the Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Organizations. Before this comparison is
made, however, an introduction to this Act is necessary.
A. The Ukrainian Act on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Organizations
The Ukrainian Act On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Organizations was passed in April of 1991. It was almost a copy of
the USSR Act with the same name, which was passed in October
1990. First and foremost, the Ukrainian Act granted religious
organizations the status of a legal entity, which stood as a significant
shift from Soviet times when religious groups existed as pseudopartnerships with very limited legal capacities.25
Apart from providing for the legal status of religious
organizations, the Act reiterated most provisions of the international
(mainly UN) instruments of human rights, and particularly the
freedom of religion. From this viewpoint, the Ukrainian Act was in
the 1990s (and maybe now) one of the most adjusted to
international standards in this field. However, its main weakness was,
and is, its declarative nature: the Act’s concrete implementing
provisions do not provide for an effective mechanism to ensure its
wonderful declarations are realized.26
For instance, Chapter 1 of the Act echoes Article 9 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, announcing in broad
declarative fashion:

24. Id. § 152; see also id. §§ 130, 145.
25. It may sound quite surprising, but the right to religious freedom as a constitutional
principle was declared in all constitutions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) as
well as the Ukrainian SSR constitutions.
26. It should be borne in mind that Ukraine belongs to the family of civil law countries;
therefore, it is virtually impossible to develop declarative provisions by judge-made law like has
happened with the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
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Everyone enjoys the right to freedom of conscience. This right
includes freedom to voluntary adhere, embrace and change one’s
religion or beliefs and freedom, either alone or in community with
others to profess whichever religion or do not profess anyone,
worship, manifest in public and freely disseminate one’s religious or
atheistic beliefs.
....
Exercise of the freedom to manifest a religion or beliefs shall be
subject only to such limitations as are necessary for securing public
safety and public order, life, health and morality as well as rights
and freedoms of others citizens which are prescribed by law and
comply with international commitments of Ukraine. 27

Notwithstanding the opening chapter’s broad assertion of a
universal freedom of religion, the specific provisions of the Act seem
counterproductive to this rather lofty goal. For example, the Act
includes an exhaustive list of forms in which religious organizations
could be established.28 This list is very limited, based on religious
(and not on legal) classification, and does not embrace even such
traditional religious entities as monastic orders or hermitages. There
is no justification or explanation in the Act or other official
documents as to why legislators limited the forms in which religious
organizations could be established—although such limitation
obviously constitutes restriction on religious freedom.
This is just one example of discrepancy between the Act’s
declarations and regulatory provisions exercised by administrative
bodies in everyday practice. According to the Council of Europe, the
main drawbacks of the Act, excluding the one just mentioned, are:
1) it requires ten adults to have the statute [i.e. charter] of a
religious organization registered, whereas the same requirement
for other civic associations is only three adults;
2) it prohibits the creation of local or regional divisions without
legal entity status, such as branches and subsidiaries;
3) it lacks the possibility for granting legal entity status to religious
associations [i.e. unions], such as the Catholic or Orthodox
Churches, etc.;

27. Act of Ukraine, On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, art. 3
(Apr. 23, 1991).
28. Id. at art. 7.
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4) it discriminates against foreigners and stateless persons;
5) it lacks clarity with regard to which organizations are required to
register with regional state administrations and which with the
State Committee on Religious Affairs;
6) the Law [i.e. the Act] also contains a number of other
ambiguous provisions, which leave a wide discretion to the
implementing authorities. 29

As was pointed out above, the Act On the Freedom of Conscience
and Religious Organizations was approved on the eve of Ukrainian
independence. Regrettably, during the following years when Ukraine
approved fundamental legal acts like the Constitution (1996) and
the Civil Code (2003), the Act was never amended significantly.
Consequently, I fully subscribe to the conclusion of Mrs. Severinsen
and Mrs. Wohlwend, the former Monitoring Committee coreporters of the PACE, who suggested that “the quite progressive
law [i.e. the Act] for the time of its adoption now requires significant
rewording.” 30
B. The Svato-Mykaylivska Parish’s Legal Status Under the Ukrainian
Act of 1991
Having provided the critical outline of the Ukrainian Act
designed to ensure religious freedom and regulate the relationship
between the government and religious organizations, and before
returning to the ECtHR’s judgment, I must address the legal status
of the Parish, its corporate governance, and its interrelation with
other Churches, i.e. religious unions with which the Parish is
affiliated.
When the Svato-Mykhaylivska Parish was set up in April 1989, it
immediately began various activities, including collecting the
necessary documents and permissions to launch construction of a
temple complex, even though it was not yet recognized as a legal

29. Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Ukraine, EUR. PARL. DOC. 10676,
§ 269 (2005), available at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc05/
EDOC10676.htm. The judgment, Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya, quotes this document at § 87.
30. Id.
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entity. Probably until February 1993, 31 the Parish acted in the
capacity of some kind of partnership and not as a corporate body.
From the moment the Parish shifted the form of business
ownership and obtained the status of a legal entity, it “belonged to
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate).” 32
However, the term “belong” here is not precise enough from a legal
point of view. As was mentioned above, the Act does not permit
legal entity status for religious unions that include not just persons,
but also other religious organizations. Thus, centralized churches
like the Orthodox Church or the Catholic Church cannot receive
legal entity status in Ukraine. Instead, the Act provides that
“[r]eligious
unions
are
represented
by
their
centers
(administrations).”33 However, a center or an administration of the
type mentioned in the Act is no more than a management body of a
religious union and as such could not comprise, much less “possess,”
any other organizations.
Thus, from a legal point of view, it is impossible for the Parish as
a legal entity to “belong” to a religious union (like the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate) which does not enjoy
any legal status. Because of this, relations between the Parish and the
Church also are barred from being adjusted by agreement or
contract. The sole document which governs participation of the
Church authorities in the Parish management is the Parish Charter.
According to the Act, a charter should contain information
indicating what type of religion the organization follows and “place
of the religious organization in the institutional framework of the
religious union.”34 No legislative provision requires specification in a
charter of the role that ecclesiastical authorities are to play in the
management of the organization’s activities.
Moreover, the Act provides: “The State takes into account
traditions and internal guidelines of religious organizations and
respects them as long as they conform to the law” 35 and adds that

31. See Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, §§ 13–14, application no. 77703/01
(2007), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (follow “Case-Law” hyperlink; then
follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search application number “77703/01”).
32. See id. § 14.
33. Act of Ukraine, On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, art.
7(2) (Apr. 23, 1991).
34. Id. at art. 12(1)–(2).
35. Id. at art. 5(3).
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“[r]eligious organizations in Ukraine . . . act according to their
hierarchic and institutional structure, elect, appoint and rotate their
staff in accordance with their charters (regulations).” 36 It further
provides: “A religious organization as a legal entity exercises rights
and obligations determined by the legislation in force and its own
charter.”37 As for religious communities, the legislation states:
The State recognizes the right of a religious community 38 to
subordinate itself in canonical or organizational matters to any
religious centre (administration) residing within or outside
Ukraine, as well as free change of such a subordination.39

It could be concluded from the quoted provisions that the
Ukrainian legislation deems religious organizations, particularly
those like a religious community founded directly by believers and
not by another legal entity, as autonomous, self-governing units with
wide discretion. In accordance with legal logic, authorities of a
religious union should enjoy as much authority in the community’s
business as the community has granted them. Under such legal
conditions, ecclesiastical authorities are capable of curbing the
community’s powers and increasing their own power in the
community’s business only by the addition of the appropriate
provisions into the community charter. That explains why in the
analyzed case the ecclesiastical authority (Kyivan Metropolitan of the
UOC MP) again and again demanded that the Parish approve a
standard charter which would grant to the former a “golden share”
in the Parish. Perhaps the same consideration induced the
Parishioners’ Assembly to resist such demands.40
Accordingly, it was the Parish’s charter which regulated not only
the corporate governance of the religious community but also the
sensitive issue of denomination affiliation and its subsequent shift.
The Kyivan Metropolitan (the “religious centre” of the Ukrainian
36. Id. at art. 7(1).
37. Id. at art. 13(2).
38. In the text of the judgment, the Ukrainian term “religiyna hromada” was translated
as a “religious group,” while it should be translated as a “religious community” to convey its
meaning precisely. See Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, application no. 77703/01
(2007).
39. Act of Ukraine, On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, art.
8(2) (Apr. 23, 1991) (emphasis added). The translation of this provision given in the
judgment is quite loose. See Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya, § 83.
40. See Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya, §§ 15, 17.
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Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate) failed to persuade the
Parish to amend its charter even though it was clear that ecclesiastical
authority could put the Parish under an interdict or other canonical
punishment. The Metropolitan was unable to legally prevent the
Parish from changing its affiliation because the latter did so by virtue
of the appropriate provisions of its charter. Therefore, the core
question for those Ukrainian authorities, including the relevant
judicial bodies that dealt with the Parish’s dispute, should have been
whether the original Parishioners’ Assembly acted intra vires in
deciding to change the jurisdiction and canonical guidance of the
Parish.41 Unfortunately, this was not the approach taken by those
authorities.
From this point of view, the principal finding of the ECtHR may
be reduced to one observation: instead of scrutinizing whether the
body (or rather bodies) of the divided Parish acted in line with the
Parish’s charter and in such a way maintained respect for the
autonomy of the religious community, Ukrainian authorities
unjustifiably interfered into the field of religious freedom and
freedom of association.42 However, even with such a welcome
outcome, the judgment of the Strasbourg bench is not above
criticism.
C. The ECtHR’s Missed Opportunity
I begin my criticism of the ECtHR’s judgment by pointing out
some minor factual mistakes in its text. The judgment states: “On 22
March 1992 the Parishioners’ Assembly passed resolutions for the
religious association to change denomination, as it was dissatisfied
with the leadership of Archbishop Filaret, the head of the newly
registered Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate . . . .” 43
In March 1992, Metropolitan (the correct title that, in the Orthodox
hierarchy, is higher than Archbishop) Filaret was the head of the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate. The formal
meeting of bishops (Archbishop Council) of the Russian Orthodox
Church that forced him to resign office took place from March 31 to
April 4, 1992, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv
Patriarchate was set up about two months later on June 25, 1992.
41. See id. § 23.
42. Id. § 152.
43. Id. § 12 (emphasis added).
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Therefore, it is not possible that Metropolitan Filaret headed the
Kyiv Patriarchate in March 1992, because the latter did not then
exist. However, this factual error certainly is not vital as it by no
means affected the outcome of the Court’s judgment.
The ECtHR continued its judgment by aptly criticizing the legal
framework in which religious organizations provided their activity in
Ukraine.44 Nevertheless, it seems that in attacking Ukrainian
legislation, the Strasbourg Court fell into the snare of loose
translation, stating:
[T]here is a clear inconsistency in the domestic law as to what
constitutes a “religious organisation” and what constitutes a
“religious group”, or whether they have the same meaning, the
only difference between the two being the local status of a
“religious group” and the lack of any requirement for its official
registration under the Act. 45

In fact, the Act referenced by the Court sufficiently and clearly
distinguishes these two concepts. “Religious organisation” is a
generic term which covers all religious establishments, while the term
“religious group” (or rather “community” or “parish,” language
which more correctly conveys the meaning of the Ukrainian word
“hromada”) is specific for a type of religious organization formed
directly by believers.46 Nevertheless, this misstatement was not
essential to the Court’s finding. Aside from this terminological
misunderstanding and the Court’s silence regarding the impossibility
that religious unions could be granted legal entity status, the
Strasbourg Court’s criticism of Ukrainian legislation was wellgrounded and entirely correct.
But the ECtHR’s later fallacy was not so innocuous. Despite the
existence of a number of inconsistencies and ambiguities in the
Ukrainian Act On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Organizations, the Act does contain a set of sufficiently clear
provisions that call for safeguarding the autonomy of religious
communities against arbitrary state interference. In particular, the
Act guarantees religious communities the freedom to subordinate
themselves to religious centers and to change such affiliations
44. See id. §§ 130, 145, 152.
45. See id. § 145.
46. Act of Ukraine, On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisation, art.
7(2) (Apr. 23, 1991).
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freely.47 It also declares respect for traditions and internal guidelines
of religious organizations.48 Further, it clearly provides that
“religious organizations in Ukraine . . . act according to their
hierarchic and institutional structure, elect, appoint and rotate their
staff in accordance with their charters (regulations).” 49
The ECtHR asserted that the Ukrainian authorities’ refusal to
register the amendments to the Parish statute, an action later upheld
by Ukrainian courts, was caused principally “by the lack of coherence
and foreseeability” of the legislation.50 This conclusion is doubtful.
My Ukrainian experience, along with my examination of Ukrainian
legislation and information I obtained from state officials, 51 convince
me that the apt English words for the Ukrainian authorities’ actions
in this case are “arbitrariness” and “bias.” However, it should be
kept in mind that the European Court of Human Rights must be
much more politically correct when it criticizes a foreign country
than do scholars when they judge their own countrymen.
One last remark should be made in this section. From my point
of view, the Strasbourg Court did not focus enough on the fact that
believers who decided to change their denomination would have
faced no problem implementing such action. Nobody prevented or
hindered the adherents from transferring themselves to another
church and registering a new religious community. Rather, the
crucial issue was which part of the divided religious community
enjoyed the legal right to make such a decision on behalf of the
Parish as a legal entity, especially considering that such a decision
would concern canonical and organizational subordination to
ecclesiastical authorities and the change of such subordination.
As was previously mentioned, the Ukrainian authorities that dealt
with the Parish’s case faced a fundamental choice: to base their
decisions on the charter as the Parish’s internal constitution
(inasmuch as its provisions do not directly contravene the law) or to
judge the case by other reasons, only taking the Parish’s charter into
account inter alia as one, but not the core, benchmark against which
the dispute could be measured. Unfortunately, Ukrainian authorities
refused the first way, which presupposed that the clash between
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
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believers would be judged as a purely corporate dispute. 52 Had the
Ukrainian authorities chosen to do so, it would have been a clear and
easy case. Most likely, the original Parish’s Assembly would have
removed the formal obstacle for the registration of the charter’s
amendments, namely the lack of the former’s signature on the
amendments of December 24, 1999,53 and the argument would
have been resolved.
In contrast, Ukrainian authorities, particularly those courts that
dealt with the Parish’s case, employed an alternative strategy.
Consequently, the domestic courts’ reasoning seems vague and
inconsistent. For example, the Kyiv City Court treated the Parish like
a Church subsidiary that was established or owned by the
ecclesiastical authority, not as an autonomous association of believers
that was free to determine its religious affiliation.54 Moreover, the
Supreme Court of Ukraine judged the case not from within the
scope of the Parish’s charter, but rather scrutinized the charter
against current Ukrainian legislation.55 The Supreme Court found
that the charter contravened the law, particularly the fixed
membership in the religious community prescribed by it. These
findings were inconclusive and constitute a shining example of the
“totalitarian” perception of the law: all is prohibited except what is
clearly permitted. This approach is obviously incompatible with basic
democratic principles.
Thus, we see that the questions posed by the case at hand were
twofold. On the one hand, the Parish’s dispute led to unjustified
intrusion by state authorities into the Parish’s autonomous
arrangements, and the ECtHR ascertained such impropriety. On the
other hand, the clash between rival groups of the divided religious
community was in and of itself a purely corporate conflict that could
and should have been resolved on the basis of, and in accordance
with, the Parish’s corporate charter. The ECtHR failed to highlight
this fact properly. Consequently, the domestic follow-up of the
Strasbourg judgment upholds such a view.

52.
53.
54.
55.

Cf. Syato-Mykhayliyska Parafiya, § 139.
Cf. id. § 42.
Id. § 51 (outlining the Ukraine Supreme Court’s reasoning).
Id. § 52.
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V. FOLLOW-UP AND CONCLUSION
The follow-up to the seemingly endless Svato-Mykhaylivska
Parish narrative occurred about a year after the ECtHR’s judgment
was delivered in Strasbourg. Ukrainian legislation includes a special
act entitled On the Enforcement of Judgments and Application of
Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights. 56 Even though
Article 2 thereof declares that “[j]udgments [of the ECtHR] are
obligatory for execution by Ukraine,”57 Chapter III of the Act,
which elaborates the methods of and procedures for such an
execution, explains that, excluding pecuniary compensation, a court
victory in Strasbourg simply means that the case decided by the
ECtHR is subject to revision.58
Therefore, having won the case in Strasbourg, the Parish (or
rather the group of believers that wanted to change the affiliation of
the Parish and have been struggling to do so since the end of 1999)
simply opened the door to further domestic litigation. The original
plaintiff lodged a complaint about reopening the case, renewing its
original claim. The Supreme Court of Ukraine (which was the
domestic court of last resort that dealt with the case before it was
lodged with the Strasbourg court) granted the Parish’s complaint
only in part. It held that the case should be reopened, but refused to
deliver final judgment by itself, ordering a new hearing in the Kyiv
District Administrative Court.
In remanding the case to the Kyiv District Administrative
Court,59 the Supreme Court asserted that the Code of
Administrative Justice of Ukraine provides that if an international
judicial body, the jurisdiction of which is recognized by Ukraine,
holds that a judgment or decision delivered by a Ukrainian court
violates an international obligation of Ukraine, such judgment or
decision should be reopened and reviewed.60 Under Ukrainian law,
56. Act of Ukraine, On the Enforcement of the Judgments and Application of the CaseLaw of the European Court of Human Rights, art. 13(1) (Feb. 23, 2006), available at
http://sutyajnik.ru/rus/echr/etc/2006_law_ukraine.htm#_ftnref1.
57. Id. at art. 2(1). This quote was translated by the author from its original Ukrainian.
58. Id. at art. 10(1), (3).
59. Since the original action was brought before the court by Mr. Makarchikov in 2000,
the design of the Ukrainian judicial system has been changed. An administrative justice system
has been established, and therefore the case which fell within the jurisdiction of general courts
in 2000 fell under the jurisdiction of administrative courts in 2007.
60. CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE OF UKRAINE art. 237(2).
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reviewing the grounds of such a case is classified as an “exceptional
circumstance.” The Supreme Court noted that the judgment of the
ECtHR in Svato-Mykhaylivska Parish v. Ukraine determined that the
outcome of the national litigation violated Article 9 of the
Convention, interpreted in the light of articles 6(1) and 11 thereof.
As obiter dictum, the Ukrainian highest bench reiterated the view of
the ECtHR that the national judiciary had failed to repair the
violation of religious freedom made by administrative authorities
because of what the Court saw as a contradiction in Ukrainian
legislation and lack of foreseeability.
The Supreme Court of Ukraine also reworded ECtHR’s core
statement, asserting that the state enjoys a narrow scope of discretion
concerning restrictions of religious freedom. The highest bench
concluded that such restrictions should be defined and applied
strictly in line with the Convention and ECtHR’s interpretation
thereof. On that basis, and by virtue of Article 13 of the Act On the
Enforcement of Judgments and Application of Case-Law of the
European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court held that it is
against the law to restrict the right to freedom of religion by
ungrounded refusal to register amendments to a charter by religious
groups aimed at changing their confessional association if such
restriction is not necessary in a democratic society.
The Ukrainian Supreme Court reached the conclusion that in
dealing with the Svato-Mykhaylivska Parish case, the national
judiciary had not taken into account provisions of the European
Convention on Human Rights and its interpretation in ECtHR case
law. This is what led to the substantial fault in the domestic litigation
outcome. Therefore, the highest Ukrainian judicial body revoked the
decision and judgment of the Kyiv Court (which was confirmed by
the Supreme Court’s own decision) and expedited the case to the
Kyiv District Administrative Court for a new trial which should take
into consideration the provisions of the European Convention on
Human Rights and its interpretation in the ECtHR case law.
But the substance of the dispute has not been resolved so far,
and the longer it continues, the more complicated it becomes. This
is because the partly new religious community formed at the
beginning of 2000, and bound up with the Moscow Patriarchate,
has been running the Parish’s business for more than eight years and
has contributed significantly to the temple complex development.
Therefore, deciding how to divide the Parish’s property between the
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two religious communities will be very complicated, especially if the
injustices suffered by Kyiv Patriarchate’s adherents, led by
Mr. Makarchikov, are to be redressed. Thus, the easy and fair
solution of the dispute, based on observance of the Parish’s charter
which seemed apt in 2000, is now out of date.
What conclusions has Ukraine drawn from this case, which
constitutes the first time the state lost in litigation with a religious
organization before the Strasbourg Court? Unfortunately, and in
spite of the clear prescription of the national law that obligated
national authorities “to take an action aimed to correct the system’s
shortcomings,”61 the Ukrainian government has done nothing. No
discussion with regard to the ECtHR’s judgment has been initiated,
nor have necessary amendments to the current legislation been
drafted. Even the temple complex of Svato-Mykhaylivska Parish up
to now has remained under the control of the Moscow Patriarchate.
Fulfillment of the governing coalition’s pledge “to redraft the Act
On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organization”62 that was
given some months after the judgment became final has most likely
been left for better days.
I, however, remain optimistic. Notwithstanding the
aforementioned facts, the judgment has not passed unnoticed. I
hope this case, which lies on the junction of religious freedom
jurisprudence—with fundamental principles of constitutional and
international law on the one hand, and corporate law and
governance on the other—contributes not only to scholarly
discussion and academic reflection, but also to the development of
law and an improvement in national legislation. The main message of
the judgment is that a religious community, just as any other
corporation in private law, enjoys the right to determine its own
structure and its association with ecclesiastical authorities, including
the right to change its canonical and organizational subordination to
or affiliation with the latter. There is no doubt, at least within
Europe, that this message has been heard and has already become an
important standard for human rights.
61. See Act of Ukraine, On the Enforcement of the Judgments and Application of the
Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, art. 13(2) (Feb. 23, 2006).
62. See the Agreement Establishing the Coalition of the Democratic Forces in the 6th
Verkhovna Rada (the Parliament of Ukraine) of Nov. 29, 2007, art. 1.4, which was officially
published in HOLOS UKRAYINI [UKRAINIAN VOICE], an official Ukrainian Parliament’s
gazette, No. 223–224, Dec. 12, 2007.

574

